In this paper, we will consider cases where good sellers have an incentive to distinguish themselves from bad sellers. Of particular interest is the case where there is a single seller. Consumer information is often quite poor about those products which are new. It is just these products where (temporary) monopoly is likely to be found. Thus, we will be concerned with cases where a monopolist could have an incentive to reveal his quality even when it is low. In order for this incentive to exist, there must be some event which occurs after the sale which will reward sellers as a function of their true quality. We consider two cases.
In our first case, the seller can make statements about the product's quality which are ex post verifiable. For example, a diamond seller can disclose the weight of a diamond he is selling. He can give the buyer a warranty which states the weight of the diamond. That is, in Section 2 we will consider situations where sellers can make any disclosure about their product's quality and give a complete warranty which guarantees that the disclosure is true (for example, the diamond seller gives the buyer a written statement guaranteeing that the diamond can be returned if an objective party finds that its weight is less than specified).
The second case which we consider is where statements about product quality are too costly either to communicate or verify ex post. For this reason, the statements cannot be guaranteed. However, we assume that there is some characteristic which is observable ex post. For example, the quality of an automobile's construction is difficult to describe or verify ex post. However, it may be easy to verify ex post whether the auto "breaks down." If it is the case that low-quality items have a higher probability of breakdown than do high-quality, then warranties which guarantee against (the ex post cheaply observable) breakdown can substitute for guarantees regarding (the ex post very costly to observe) quality. This paper is primarily concerned with situations where consumers have had no experience and will have no further experience with the monopolist. This is the case where the monopolist will have the greatest incentive to mislead. Our basic result is, however, that the monopolist will not be able to mislead rational consumers about the quality of his product. In Section 2, we assume that the monopolist has the ability to make ex post verifiable statements about his quality. We show that consumers with rational expectations will assume that the monopolist is of the worst possible quality consistent with his disclosure when he makes less than a full disclosure. The monopolist, realizing this, decides to make a full disclosure. This result generalizes the result in Grossman and Hart.3 In Section 3, where verifiable disclosure is assumed to be impossible, the monopolist can offer warranties. It is assumed that the warranty is conditional on an event, the probability of which depends only on the seller's quality. Further, the consumer is assumed to be risk averse. In this case, we show that if a seller offers less than a full warranty, consumers with rational expectations will conclude that he is trying to mislead them about the product's quality. Each consumer knows that it is Pareto optimal for the seller to sell the item at the consumer's reservation price with a complete warranty. Hence a seller would only offer less than a complete warranty if it would make the seller better off than the complete warranty contract. But then it would have to make the consumer worse off than the complete warranty contract. But this would give the consumer less than his reservation price, so he does not make the purchase.
The above arguments are based upon adverse selection against sellers which make consumers bear the risk associated with not knowing the quality of their product. This is to be contrasted with signaling arguments. Spence has presented a model with many different sellers who have marginal costs of production that depend on their quality.4 In his model (where consumers differ in risk aversion), there is an equilibrium distribution of qualities and warranties outstanding at a given time. Further, high-quality firms offer a larger warranty than do low-quality firms, thus signaling their quality. This result is very different from mine. It requires that consumers have information about the statistical relationship between warranties and quality. He further requires that there are many competing sellers extant at a given moment. I have presented a much weaker equilibrium concept which is appropriate for markets with a single seller and many buyers. Further, because there is only a single seller, I am able to be more precise in defining consumers' conjectures about the seller's quality than is normally done in a signaling model. In a signaling model, consumers can only get information from the equilibrium contract schedule, while in my model it is the consumers' conjectures about the monopolist's quality out of equilibrium which forces the monopolist to choose a particular equilibrium. In my model, the monopolist is unable to mislead consumers because of the rational conjectures consumers have regarding what his quality must be if he deviates from a full-information Pareto optimal contract. In the equilibrium I present, consumers are unable to determine the seller's quality by inverting the equilibrium contract. This is what distinguishes the result and model presented here from Spence and other signaling models.
A MODEL OF PRIVATE DISCLOSURE
In this section we assume that it is possible for a seller to make ex post verifiable disclosures. For example, a diamond seller can specify the weight of the diamond; a doctor can specify the medical school he graduated from, his class standing, the number of malpractice suits he is engaged in, and so forth. In this section, we will be concerned with disclosures that have negligible ex post verification cost and also negligible communications cost. For example, it would be very costly for a doctor to explain to a patient, in detail, his contribution to the study of ulcers. This might involve imparting four years' worth of medical school training to the patient. Yet, if the patient must choose between two doctors, this information gross of acquisition costs is very valuable (while net of acquisition costs it is of no value). Note further than the doctor may desire to substitute low communications cost information such as, "I am the best ulcer doctor in the world," but such a statement is not easily subject to verification (primarily because it is not sufficiently detailed-what does "best" mean?).
In this section we will not model a consumer's decision about verifying ex post the truth of the statement made by the seller. Rather, for simplicity, we will limit attention to situations where all of the seller's statements are costlessly verifiable ex post. A clear example is where the seller is selling boxes of oranges. If the seller states that there are ten oranges in a box, then this becomes verifiable ex post for free. It is important that the information be publically verifiable for the purpose of this section. In particular, if the seller states that a product will " make the buyer happy," then this fact is not open to easy third-party verification. When the seller states that the diamond weighs one ounce, this is very cheap to verify ex post.
There has been much recent interest in laws which require sellers to make particular disclosures. This is to be distinguished from antifraud laws which make it illegal for a seller to lie.5 It is sometimes argued that there are disclosures that are of negligible cost but are not made by sellers in an attempt to mislead buyers. Hence a law is needed which requires such disclosures. This section focuses on cases of costless disclosure to derive insight about the issue of what a firm would voluntarily disclose.
We restrict attention to disclosures which are truthful. (For example, a seller who says nothing is making a truthful disclosure. A seller with a diamond which weighs one ounce who states that it weighs at least onehalf ounce is making a truthful disclosure, while if the same seller said that his diamond weighs two ounces it would not be truthful.) We consider only truthful disclosures for two reasons. First, we are interested in analyzing the benefits of a positive disclosure law which are above and beyond those provided by a law against lying. Second, if there are zero ex post verification costs, sellers would warranty their disclosures. Any seller who did not warranty his disclosure would immediately be assumed to be lying; that is, saying nothing. As can easily be seen from the analysis to be given below, unwarranteed disclosures could easily be incorporated. In situations where there is objective, costless ex post verification and no communications costs, we can most clearly elucidate the role of positive disclosure. In situations where sellers do not lie, the only issue is how much of the truth they will decide to tell. In particular, if a seller has a bad product, will he say nothing, leading consumers to believe his product is of average quality? Will adverse selection by the low-quality sellers drive out the high-quality sellers? If the market is competitive, then this will clearly not be the case. That is, if there is free entry into the sellers' activity, then good sellers will make disclosures to distinguish themselves from bad sellers. If any good seller should be lumped with the bad sellers due to nondisclosure, then the good seller could costlessly disclose his quality and be distinguished, getting a higher price.
The case of free entry is reasonably obvious. However, in many important cases involving consumer uncertainty, free entry may be an inappropriate assumption. Consumer information is relatively poor about new products. There may only be one firm selling a new product because of patent protection or because that firm is a particularly rapid innovator. Schumpeter has argued that an extremely important role of the competitive system is in encouraging innovation via the temporary monopoly power won by the fastest innovator.6 Thus it is important to ask whether a monopolist would find it in his interest to make a full disclosure. It is remarkable that if the monopolist has customers with rational expectations, then it will be in his interest to make a complete disclosure. It will be shown that adverse selection works against a monopolist who makes less than a full disclosure. The idea of the analysis can be seen from a simple example. Suppose the monopolist is selling boxes of apples. He can label the boxes with an exact number of apples, but if he does then his must be the true amount under the above "no lying" assumptions. However, he could also put no label as to the quantity or he could state, "There are at least three apples in the box." Suppose that from the size of the box consumers can tell that the box holds between zero and 100 apples, and they also know that the seller knows how many apples are in the box. Suppose the seller says nothing about the number in the box. Then a consumer could rationally conclude that the box contains no apples, for if there were, say, three apples in the box, the seller could have said, "There are at least three apples in the box." Similarly, suppose a seller makes the statement, "There are at least six apples in the box." This must mean that there are exactly six apples in the box, for if there were really seven, then the seller could have made more profit by saying that there are at least seven apples in the box. This is because the expected number of apples in the box under the latter statement is higher than the former, so consumers will be willing to pay more. Thus there is a kind of adverse selection against a seller who does not make a full disclosure, even though he is the only seller. Consumers rationally expect a seller's quality to be the poorest possible consistent with his disclosure. The seller, knowing that consumers will only offer to pay the lowest amount consistent with his disclosure, finds it optimal to disclose the highest possible quality consistent with the truth; that is, he discloses the truth when he knows it. The remainder of this section is devoted to providing a formal model of the above.
Let q be a vector of characteristics which gives a consumer utility. A product of unknown quality can be modeled as a product where the consumer does not know which particular vector of characteristics the commodity contains (for example, see Leland for an analysis which uses characteristics to model product quality.)7 Let Q represent the set of all possible vectors of characteristics. Assume that if a consumer has income I, then his willingness to pay for a particular known vector q is given by the p such that
where u is the utility he can get by not consuming the commodity. We will sometimes call p "the consumer's reservation price." We will take u as an exogenous description of the best alternative available opportunity for the consumer. We assume that the consumer is only interested in zero or one unit and that all consumers are identical. Assume that U is increasing in I. This paper is concerned with situations where sellers know more than buyers about the quality of a product. We represent the buyers' knowledge about the product by specifying a probability distribution on Q. For example, if there are only two possible qualities, ql and q2, and y is the where the consumer assesses yi to be the probability that qi is the true quality. If we let y = (31, y2, . . *) be his probability assessment, then his expected utility is V(y, p) = E yiU(qi, I -p).
i Hence, if the buyer has beliefs /, his willingness to pay will bep(~y), which is the p such that
The seller wants to maximize the price he gets for the item. We assume that the seller has no long-term relationship with the buyer or with other buyers that a given buyer may communicate with. (I make this assumption to create the strongest case for nondisclosure.) The seller can choose to make a disclosure about q. We model this disclosure by assuming that the seller picks a set of q' s denoted by D and states: "My q is an element of D (denoted by q e D)." For example, if the seller states D = {q,, q2}, then this means that his quality is either q, or q2. Note that the larger is the set D which a seller reports, the less a consumer can infer about his true quality. A seller could state q e Q and this is equivalent to making no disclosure, for then he is merely stating that his quality is any possible quality. Let D(q) be the disclosure made by the seller if his true quality is q. Then it must be the case that q E D(q).
This is because we have assumed lying is impossible. Equilibrium is characterized by the function D(q), which describes the optimal disclosure set for a seller when his quality is q. There are two ways by which consumers can infer q from D(q). First, the seller may reveal everything so D(q) _ {q}.8 Second, the consumer may be able to reason that only a particular quality seller, say qi, would find it profit maximizing to make a disclosure D(qi). That is, the function D(q) may be invertible. For example, suppose that the consumer convinces himself that only a seller of type q~ would make a disclosure like DE = {qi, qi+, q+2, . . .} (that is, the seller states, "My quality is at least q~"); then in this case the quality of the seller can be inferred from D, even though D is not a one-element set.
In order to define a seller's profit-maximizing disclosure, it is necessary to decide how much a consumer is willing to pay for the item, given that a particular disclosure D is made. Let pi denote the consumer's willingness to pay for an item of sure quality qi; that is, pi solves U(qi, I -pi) = U.
It is convenient to label the qualities in order of consumers' willingness to pay, so that Pi <p2 < P3 < . . . . 
The right-hand side of (7) 
U(qi, I -p{y[D(qi)]}) > u > U(qj, I -p{y[D(qi)]}). (9)
But (a) is impossible by the convention that different qualities are associated with different willingnesses to pay, see (6). Hence (b) must hold. But (9) states that the consumer is doing strictly better than u in the event of high quality qi. This means that the seller is getting a lower price than he would if he revealed exactly that q = qi when his quality is qi; that is, p{y[D(qi)]} < pi. This contradicts (7). We have shown that an equilibrium inference function y[D(q)] must reveal q to the consumer. The essence of the argument is the assumption that the seller could have always disclosed the exact quality. The only reason for the seller not to do so is that he could make higher profit by reporting a larger set. However, the only way he can get a higher profit is by making the same disclosure both when he has high quality and when he has low quality. But this is not optimal. When the seller has high quality, he should certainly reveal exactly what his quality is. Hence consumers know immediately that he has low quality when the seller does not make a full disclosure.
It is essential to note that we do not assume that consumers have had a lot of experience with the seller, and are thus able to learn the relationship between the actual disclosure D(q) made by a seller of type q and his true quality q. Instead, we argue that, for example, if a seller says nothing about his quality the consumers infer that he is of the lowest possible quality, because only a seller of the lowest quality would find it profit maximizing to say nothing. A seller whose actual quality is q2 Gust above the lowest quality) would have been better off saying, "My quality is at least q2." With lying impossible, every rational consumer will be willing to pay more to a seller who says his q is at least q2 than they will to a seller who says nothing. Hence only the worst possible seller would say nothing. A similar argument shows that only a seller of quality qi would find it profit maximizing to state: "My quality is at least q~."9
WARRANTIES AND INDIRECT DISCLOSURE
The previous section considered commodities where disclosure about quality involves (a) negligible communication cost and (b) negligible cost of making ex post verifiable statements. As noted earlier, there exist situations where the seller has some information about a product, the disclosure of which would be costly. (For example, a used-car salesman can make statements about the kind of driver who previously owned the car, but the making of verifiable statements might be costly, as would an objective inspection of the car.) In this section, we consider the extreme case where the cost to the seller of making relevant statements or of the buyer determining the quality before purchase is larger than the difference in value between the best and worst possible commodity. We maintain the assumption that the seller knows the quality of the commodity, and this quality is exogenous. As before, we consider a situation where buyers have no experience with sellers and will have no future relationship with them.
Under the above assumptions, all sellers will be judged to be identical. Each seller, whether his commodity is best or worst, will receive the same price. There are two situations to consider. If there are no warranties or any other device other than price to signal quality, then we will have the usual "lemons" problem. There will be adverse selection against highquality sellers. Each high-quality seller will want to be distinguished from those of average quality, but in this case there is no way for him to do so.
In some situations, sellers can attempt to distinguish their quality even if disclosures are very costly. This can be done with warranties. It seems intuitively plausible that a seller of a high-quality item can offer a better warranty than can be offered by a low-quality seller. Of course, for this to make sense, it is necessary that something be ex post objectively observable by buyers and sellers. For example, a doctor can warranty a patient against the recurrence of an illness, a manufacturer can offer a warranty against breakdown, a lawyer can take a fee contingent on success, etc. In each of these cases, it is observable ex post when the patient gets sick, the car breaks, or the legal battle is lost. In many cases such events will be much easier to verify ex post than will be the ex ante statements a seller makes about his quality, and will have lower communication cost. For example, the lawyer could try to tell the customer about all his previous cases, why losing particular cases was not his fault, compare his record with the records of other lawyers, and so on. Such statements are far more complicated and costly to the buyer and seller than a statement like "Pay me $1,000 if I lose and $10,000 if I win." Sometimes the information is impossible to convey in an ex post verifiable way. A doctor may know that he is the best doctor in existence, but there is no way (at a reasonable cost) that he can prove this to a prospective patient. In situations in which a seller's information cannot be conveyed to a buyer, the seller's warranty can, in effect, transmit that information to the buyer. There is a sense in which the degree of warranty can be a sufficient statistic for the seller's information.
To develop the warranty idea, we consider a special case of product quality. In particular, for simplicity assume there are two states of nature: a "good" state and a "bad" state. Let b o be the benefit the consumer gets in the good state and b2 his benefit in the bad state, where b, > b2. Suppose that the only possible difference between products is the probability that the good state will arise. (For example, the only difference among cars is the probability of breakdown or among lawyers the probability that the case is won.) A warranty gives the consumer some payment w in state 2 only, while in the good state the consumer gets no payment from the seller. For notational simplicity, we consider a two-period model with a zero interest rate between the periods. In the initial period, a contract is signed and the consumer pays p dollars, while in the second period if state 2 arises the firm pays the consumer w, and in state 1 it pays nothing to the consumer. We will assume that there are no moral hazards on the consumer's part, so that the consumer cannot affect the probability of the states, and that the seller knows the buyer's benefits b, and b2. In this case, it does not matter whether a warranty involves a dollar payment or some repairs, or a combination of both.
We consider first what would happen if the buyer knows the quality of the seller's item. Let vr be the probability of the good state and let the seller charge a price p with warranty w. If the seller sells many units of the product, his revenue per unit, by the law of large numbers, will be nonstochastic. His revenue per unit is R(r, p, w) --rp + (1 -rr) (p -w), 
bi is the dollar value of the commodity in state i and u (') is the consumer's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. A Pareto optimal contract would involve choosing p, w to maximize R(,r, p, w) subject to the constraint that V(,re, p, w) > A, where A is a number which determines the division of consumer surplus between the seller and buyer. Let u be the best utility level the consumer could attain elsewhere. Then monopoly is the Pareto optimal contract with A = u. If many firms with the same ,r competed and ,re = rr, then the competitive equilibrium would involve a choice ofp, w to maximize V(r, p, w) subject to R (r7, p, w) > 0 (where we take production as having already occurred and no more production is possible; more will be said about this assumption below). Clearly, for any X, if the consumer is strictly risk averse (u" < 0), then a Pareto optimal contract p?, w? involves equalizing the consumer's net income in both states; that is, bi -p? = b2 -p? + w?, equivalently bl -b2 = w?.
In the case of a monopolist, p? would be chosen so that V(re, pO, w?) = u(b~ -p?) = u,
while perfect competition among sellers with an identical *r will drive p? down to where R(,r, p?, w?) = 0; that is, where p? = (1 -7r)w? = (1 -,r) (b1 -b2).
We are interested in situations where consumers do not know *r. To facilitate the analysis, consider Figure 1 , which is drawn for two types of firms; the firm with the highest *X denoted by Th,, and the firm with the lowest ,r denoted by rt. For each firm, the zero revenue line is drawn, and labeled R(,r, p, w) = 0. The consumer's indifference curve, which is tangent to each revenue line, is also drawn, and labeled V (,r, p, w) When the firm and the consumer have the same beliefs about rr, a tangency occurs at the full insurance point w = bl -b2. Note that firm revenue is higher below and to the right of the iso-revenue line, while the consumer's utility is higher to the left and above his indifference curve. It is easy to dispose of the competitive cases when the consumer does not know a particular firm's rr but where the consumer knows the distribution of rr's across firms. (By competitive, we mean that there are more potential products than buyers, and sellers do not collude.) First, suppose all firms have the same rr; for example, Trh. Suppose one firm offers a contract like the point A in the figure. Then another firm could offer a slightly higher warranty, and this would be purchased since the consumer would know that they are of equal quality. The only undominated contract is at the tangency point B.
Another competitive case which is easy to analyse is where there are, say, two types in the population 77r and rh, but consumers cannot identify which firm is of which quality. There are two subcases to consider, depending on which type is the marginal firm.1? First suppose that the number of identical consumers, say n, is such that the high-quality firms can satisfy all of demand. In this case, the equilibrium contract will be B in 10 Note that in this model there is no production. Further, to insure that finns supply competitively, we assume that all firms together can more than supply the n identical consumers, each of whom wants at most one unit. For this reason, if consumers observe rr, equilibrium will be characterized by a zero net price: R(7*, p,w?) = 0 for the marginal quality Tr*. The only issue is which firms will sell their products. If we assumed that there was a production cost c, then competitive equilibrium with full information would be characterized by R (7T*, p,w?) = c for the marginal quality Tr* (as long as this contract gives consumers at least u).
Figure 1. For if a contract like
A is offered, then it will be dominated by a full warranty contract on the line BC. Note that consumers do not have to make inferences about the quality of items sold with full warranty contracts. Hence a consumer will always prefer a contract like B to a contract like A or C. The other competitive subcase is when the lower-quality firms are the marginal quality; that is, the high-quality firms cannot satisfy demand, but all the potential firms together more than satisfy demand. In this case, the equilibrium contract will be D. (Note that because D involves full insurance, a consumer does not care about ft.) To see this, note that the only contract firms that would prefer to offer to D would be to the right of the R(7rl, p, w) = 0 line. Suppose the best firm, 7ra, switches from D to a point in the region labeled E. There will be points in E which are better for a 7ra firm than is D. However, there is no point in region E which can be better for both the T7r firm and for the consumer than is D. This is because D is a Pareto optimal point; it involves full insurance. Hence a consumer offered a contract in E would know that it was worse than D if it knew that a good firm offered it. If a consumer would not buy the best firm's offer of something in E if he could get D, he surely would not buy any (unidentified) firm's offer of something in E when he can get D. All other points are also clearly worse than D since they involve higher prices and less warranty than D.
The previous results are based on the idea that when the consumer is offered contracts involving a complete warranty (that is, where w = b, -b2), then he does not care about quality. If there are a sufficient number of firms, then competition among firms will drive out contracts which do not offer a full warranty. As we noted earlier, consumers will be least informed about those products which are new, and it is exactly the case of new products where monopoly is most likely to be found. Thus it is extremely important to see whether the results of this section generalize to the case of monopoly. In particular, will a monopolist of very low quality be treated as if he is of average quality by a consumer? Without disclosure or warranties, then, the answer is yes. However, we will extend the results of the last section to show that there will be adverse selection against a monopolist who does not offer a full warranty, and thus even monopoly will be characterized by the same type of contracts which would arise as in the case where consumers know the monopolist's quality exactly.
Consider , w? ). The point F is the contract which would arise if a monopolist of either quality maximized his revenue subject to the constraint that a consumer knew his quality and that the consumer must get an expected utility of u. We will now use an argument similar to that of the last section to show that F is also the outcome even if the consumer does not know ,r. An optimal contract for a monopolist of type rr is a pair (p, w) which maximizes his revenue subject to the constraint that a rational consumer is willing to buy it. In order to describe the set of contracts that a consumer is willing to purchase, it is necessary to describe what a consumer expects a firm's quality to be as a function of the contract offered; that is, to define re(p, w). First, note that if a firm offers a contract with a complete warranty, then it does not matter what rTe( *) is; the consumer will purchase the contract if and only if p < pO. However, suppose a consumer sees a contract like L in Figure 2. (In Figure 2, L is a point (w, p) just above and to the left of the indifference curve V(7rh,p, w) = u.) Should the consumer buy it? Note that it is below his u indifference curve if it is the low quality, while it is above his u indifference curve if it is the high quality (that is, he would not buy it if he knew it was of low quality). Note further that a low-quality firm will make more profit offering L than it will offering F. Hence, in order to see whether F is an equilibrium, it is necessary to see whether the consumer would be willing to buy L.
It is rational for the consumer to reason as follows. Suppose the firm offering L was a high-quality firm; then, from the figure, the point L gives a high-quality firm strictly less revenue than the point F. A high-quality firm knows that if it offered F then the consumer would buy it, since F involves complete insurance and thus the consumer knows he will get u. Hence why would a high-quality firm offer a contract like L rather than F? It would not. Thus if a firm offers L it must be of lower quality.
If there were exactly two qualities possible, the consumer would infer from L that the firm is of quality Trt and would not purchase the contract since it puts him on a 7rT indifference curve below u. However, there may be other possible qualities. Consider an iso-revenue line through L and F. That is, ifL-(PL, wL), the iso-revenue line is the set of p, w such that 
P -PL _ P --PM
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. P PM FIGURE 3 point F. Therefore L is below the indifference curve V(TrL, p, w) = U. It follows immediately that L is also below all u indifference curves for qualities less than 7rL, since these curves are less steep. Hence the consumer knows for sure that if he purchases L and L was profit maximizing for the firm offering it, then he will get less than u. Hence he does not buy it.
The above argument holds for any contract L which is not on the R(7Tr, p, w) iso-revenue curve in Figure 2 . Therefore the only candidates for equilibrium are points on that iso-revenue line. Consider a firm with quality less than 7ra. Such a firm would get strictly higher revenue at F than any other point on the R(Trh, p, w) line, since its iso-revenue line is flatter than is R(7ra, p, w). Hence any firm of quality less than 7ra will offer F. Consider a firm of quality 77a. That firm is indifferent about anything on R(Trh, p, w), so F is an optimal policy for it. However, if the firm should choose anything but F on its iso-revenue line, the consumer would immediately know that its quality is 7ra and thus that the consumer's expected utility is less than u. Hence F is strictly optimal for even the highest quality firm.
We have shown that the full insurance point will be the monopoly solution even if consumers do not know product quality. All other contracts can be eliminated because consumers would infer that they are being offered only by firms that are offering qualities insufficient for the consumers to attain a utility level of u. Such policies would only be offered by low-quality firms who wanted to be thought of as high-quality firms. One way to think of our argument is that the consumer knows that the point F is Pareto optimal. Hence he knows that any other point can only make the firm better off if it makes the consumer worse off than F. Since the consumer can do as well as F elsewhere (he can get u by not buying the product), he knows that he should not buy the product at a contract which gives the firm higher revenue than F gives the firm.TM Appendix B gives a formal definition of equilibrium and a proof of the above statements.
EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed the question of whether a monopolist can mislead consumers about his quality. Our basic principle can be described as follows: Consider the best contract that the monopolist could offer in a world where the consumers know the monopolist's quality ("the knownquality contract"). This contract extracts all the consumer surplus from the consumer and makes the monopolist as much profit as he can get. Consumers are left indifferent between buying and not buying the item. In a world where there is incomplete information, a monopolist with low quality has the potential of doing even better. If he can mislead consumers into thinking he is of high quality, then he can make the consumers worse off from buying his product instead of their next best alternative. In Section 3 we showed that this is impossible if consumers can make "rational inferences." If the "known-quality" contract does not depend on the monopolist's quality (as it does not when it involves a complete warranty), then the consumer knows that anything which makes the monopolist better off than the full information contract must make him worse off, so he does not purchase anything else.
To prove the above result, we assumed that there are no moral hazards on the part of consumers; that is, the firm solely determines the probability of breakdown of the item. It is clear that our result will still hold when there are consumer moral hazards of the following type. Suppose the consumer can affect the probability of breakdown, so that even if the firm and the consumer knew the quality of the item, full insurance would not be Pareto optimal. However, suppose the known-quality contract which is best for the monopolist provides a level of insurance which is independent of his quality. In this case, the previous argument will go through unchanged and the "unknown-quality" contract will be the same as the "known-quality" contract. Similarly, if there are production costs which depend on quality, then the "known-quality" contract will still be independent of the quality for all produced qualities (there will be a full warranty and a price set to extract all of consumer surplus). Thus, in this case, our result will be true.
There is a problem in generalizing the results of this paper to situations involving many types of consumers. As Salop has shown, if consumers who have different willingness to pay for an item also have different risk aversions, then random prices can help the monopolist sort consumers by willingness to pay.12 This increases the surplus he can extract. In our model, the monopolist, by making less than a full disclosure, or offering less than a full warranty, makes consumers bear some excess risk. Thus he may be able to increase his profit via this sorting mechanism. However, it is probably the case that there are better random devices (like random price reductions) which the monopolist can use for sorting high elasticity from low elasticity of demand consumers than incomplete disclosure or incomplete warranties.
We have tried to give some examples of situations in which firms will have an incentive to communicate their quality. Warranties seem like an incredibly useful device for getting around asymmetric information about product quality. There are many products sold with warranties, but I find it surprising that they are not used even more often. The reader might think that the answer lies with moral hazard. Yet there are many risks which are insured by insurance companies but not by sellers. A person can purchase health insurance but not usually from his doctor. I can buy theft insurance, but I cannot purchase it from the seller of burglar-alarm systems. It is very important that the insurance be sold by the commodity seller so that the terms of the insurance vary by seller. This would not matter if the insurance company knew the quality of sellers and sold insurance for products sold by different sellers at different prices. However, this also seems rare. This paper has been concerned with showing that when firms have tools available which they could use to convey information they will do so. It is not in a monopolist's interest to withhold information about product quality. If information transmittal or warranties are costless, then there is no role for government intervention to encourage disclosure. Thus, the argument that there should be a positive disclosure law or governmentmandated warranties cannot be justified on the grounds that these tools have negligible social and private cost, and high benefits through giving consumers more information about product quality or less risk about product quality. One might conclude that a positive disclosure law does no harm as well. Unfortunately, disclosure laws are often very broad. Securities law requires the issuer of a new stock to disclose all facts which are material to a purchaser.13 This requirement may have disadvantages relative to what would arise if there is no positive disclosure law. After the purchase bad events do occur which were not perfectly predictable. 13 It is no accident that positive disclosure laws are very broad. If there were a few very specific pieces of information relevant to a buyer, then the theorem of this paper would apply: a buyer would simply ask the seller about these pieces of information. A positive disclosure law appears to have benefits when the characteristics of product quality are so vague that a consumer literally has no idea of what to ask. For example, there are so many possible defects in a house that the information costs of disclosing that each possible characteristic works well is much higher than having a seller make a disclosure only in the event that he is aware that there is a specific defect. This is presumably what a positive disclosure law is trying to remedy. By requiring the seller to disclose any information material to a buyer, the law attempts to reduce disclosure costs by, for example, requiring the seller to disclose only defects in his product. However, for reasons described below in the text, these laws can actually raise disclosure costs.
Buyers can always bring suit claiming that a material fact was not disclosed regarding the possibility of the bad event. The buyer can then attempt to search the seller's records for evidence. Since this can make the seller bear costs, the seller, anticipating this, discloses an enormous amount of information in the first place. Some of this information may also surely be irrelevant but could be costly to disclose. The seller, by making excessive disclosures, makes the buyer bear more costs in trying to interpret the disclosure. This can convert a situation which involves costless disclosure of truly material facts into a situation where both the buyer and seller must bear costs. An important negative consequence of this is that disclosures may no longer reveal the quality of the seller because they have become so noisy. Thus in the case where disclosure of the (truly) material facts are costless, we are better off without a positive disclosure law.
It would be useful to see how far this policy conclusion can be extended to cases where disclosure or warranties are costly. I disclose that the voluntary disclosure theorem will not be true when disclosure is costly. 
